ALF (Global Awareness of Life Form)

                               New revolutionary vision of human existence

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Free will (detailed explanation)

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Are men responsible for their actions? 

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Free will is a topic of extreme importance because it determines the choices of those who establish law and order in the various nations.

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Religions of the world think man is able to choose freely between good and evil, between right and wrong.  For this reason, every believer, to the end of life, becomes subordinate to a divine judgment that defines the prize or the punishment for the conduct displayed during existence.  Even the laws of all countries judge according to rules that presuppose the direct responsibility of individuals for what they do, emitting judgments linked to a presumed freedom of action that has its origin in free will. 

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Definition of free will: Possibility of man to carry out choices, without being subject to any necessity.

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This means that when men do actions motivated by the necessity to complete them, it is not in presence of free will.  It is very, very important to read the definition carefully in order to understand its true meaning.  Take note that this definition is not just a supposition of the author, but it can be found printed in every serious linguistic dictionary.  

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Having verified that all actions completed by men have the exclusive purpose of satisfying their own sensorial system (For more details: Man pursues only one goal), it is possible to assert that:

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no physical or mental action is put into effect without it having meaning and, at the same time, possessing a precise motivation at completion. 

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Our mind imposes a reason for every action that it wants to do, excluding no one.  Whoever is not convinced of this principle, try to consider that if we had to act so as to carry out unmotivated actions, then we would rightly be taken for crazy; therefore, every non-logical action results as foreign to human nature.  Having established that in free will choice does not have to, for definition, be determined by any necessity, such concept is inapplicable to human behavior in that, not being able to contest that every fact, action or thought of our life must compulsorily have a meaning, therefore it is born of  necessity, every human determination cannot be in any way subject to the condition demanded by free will.  Thus, we can affirm for certain that it is not possible that every human action, having to answer to necessity imposed by sensory requirements, is born of free will.  

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Consequently, not respecting the essential condition in order to obtain free will, all the truths constructed on it up until now collapse.

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How is it possible then that men, in completing their own actions, have the conviction to be able to choose freely? 

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Not predestination of events.

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Some philosophic hypotheses have attempted in the past to direct culture towards rational thought: positivism, rationalism, illuminism, etc., these were aimed at creating a better society by setting up life on a merely scientific basis. They were right, supposing that science would have changed the world, but their expectations didnít obtain immediate success. Why? The arrival of Mecchanicalism (a consequence of the aforesaid philosophies) would have implied the abolition of faith, which represented the main philosophy of society, the only thing capable of giving comfort and hope for the future of those who suffered. Moreover, condemning men to atheism, they would have imposed on believers an existence without any compensation for the unjust pain suffered in this world.  

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The most diffused observation in defence of free will says: if every event was a consequence of the previous one and cause of the successive one, reason itself would serve nothing since everything would already be written and destined to happen. If man didnít have the possibility to take part in his own destiny, it would mean that everything is predestined, every event would already be written in the history of humanity and it would serve nothing to try to change things because they would happen anyway.  It is obvious that if everything were already destined to happen, whatever analysis, deduction, and conclusion would be useless because it could not change the order of things. Following this deduction it was decided that the actions completed by men were determined by their will, which at this point would result fundamentally free, independent and arbitrary. How are things really if we apply the objective research to the world of reality? 

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In the universe, events happen according to an order that makes up our natural reality.  Having established that, to change the events by a principle of  ďnon-predestinationĒ it is indispensable that men could autonomously intervene in actions not already programmed by the old order.  We observe how, in our reality, the initial moment of the aforesaid actions is fundamental in order to modify the natural process of things.  If we had to insert our action (which is to say the perturbing element) in different successive instants, we would insert ourselves in a different external reality, since the same reality modifies itself at any moment, changing the entire directional sense of events.  

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In simple words: every person has the necessity to perform determined actions to live, which are motivated by the reasons that impose their performance.  To put into effect these actions, a variable interval of time exists where they can be started.  Example: if we had to go from one city to another, it is obvious that first we should have a good reason to do so and at the same time we would have the necessity to arrive at a determined time.  

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The variables encountered on the journey will impede knowing the precise moment of arrival, which will be determined by the many factors met along the way, but above all by the moment of departure.  The instant in which the voyage begins is basic in order to establish the events that will be lived, because the external reality changes itself continuously with the passing of time.  Everyone understands how different it would be to arrive at a fatal crossing a few moments before or after in order to escape a tragic accident, modifying our entire life accordingly.  

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The order of events is obviously linked to small differences in time in which the actions begin.  It is important to point out that the choices of the initial instant are not motivated by anything, nor linked to any obligated necessities;  in the above-mentioned case, the absolute obligation to begin our voyage in a precise and immutable instant does not exist. It can vary at our discretion within the approximate time interval established for the departure.  That initial instant is effectively determined by our will, or it could be identified as casual or unforeseeable, but it is certainly not connected to any of our obliged necessities. In this case it is really our will, in total freedom, to choose when to leave, because for us it is indifferent to start a few minutes before or after since we do not have a specific motivation for leaving at a precise and determined moment.  

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In general it is possible to assert that every action performed by man possesses in itself two different prerogatives:

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Necessitating a specific reason for it to be completed, it is obligatorily motivated.

 
     
     
 

Requiring an initial instant, that instead can be established arbitrarily, or by fatality or chance, it becomes accidental and unforeseeable.

 
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In the above-mentioned example, the only element not motivated by a constriction is the determination of the initial instant that is not essentially linked to a precise and invariable moment.  It is that exact instant that inserts our action in the external reality, substantially modifying the general course of all events, because our reality continuously interlaces itself with that of other people, modifying the habitat in which to live.  Our freedom of action is only relative to the approximate initial choice in which the necessity must be carried out, on the contrary the necessity is not arbitrary, but is obliged by the need to perform the action.

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In every day of our lives we can express our freedom of decision not only establishing the initial moment of the events, but also by choosing

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between more "equal or equivalent" solutions.

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If we decide to eat a specific food, if we opt to see a show, or if we think to make a certain choice rather than others of equal importance, we operate with a certain free will because we are not forced by a specific and obligated choice.  When we are thirsty, it is obvious that drinking is motivated by an obliged necessity, even though we choose the type of drink between what we prefer without being forced to choose one in particular.  There are many equivalent choices in life and they are due to simple chance, not to obliged motivations.  To quote Einsteinís famous phrase: 

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here, God would play dice.

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Practically, we are arbitrators for ourselves only when it is not important, while in all other cases, obligatory motivations existing, it is the external events, or the nature of how we are made, that conditions our life.  

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In conclusion:  

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even if the possibility exists to be able to arbitrarily establish the starting point of actions, or the choice between equivalent events, thereby changing the entire future, we cannot modify the decisions subject to obligatory motivation in any way. Neither is it possible to change the rules, of which material itself is subject, that determine the obligatory reasons of our behaviour. 

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Our will is subordinated to the physical structure of how we are made, it does not depend under any circumstances on our will; our every decision is subject to physical rules that are impossible to change.  

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As a general principle we must conclude that:

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there are events of equal importance which are subject to chance, ruled by physical necessities not subject to our will.

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All this means one single thing: 

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men are not morally responsible for their actions.

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This ascertainment would have to induce those who think they know the truth to consider human relationships in a very different way from the universally accepted one, inducing them to search in other directions for the true motivations for the deplorable conduct of many people.

Consequently, the existence of man cannot be subordinated to rules that implicate judgments of  merit or demerit since they are not subject to free will. 

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Man only has the impression of being the maker of his own destiny,

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in reality it is not so at all.  He can only suppose by his imagination to have the power to choose, but the invariability of physical laws prevents that such a situation takes place.

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To discover that man is not morally guilty of his acts obviously does not mean that he can do any illicit action with impunity;  now they are the motivations that induce society to punish the guilty that should be completely different from the vindictive punishment that has been used up until now. (Topic not treated in this context).

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NB: Chance that determines the equivalent choices in our dimension is defined by many complex subatomic rules that are found beyond our actual capability.  Not being able, because of actual physical limits, to know the data that could render the determination of the accidental events foreseeable, it is correct in comparing them to assume the relative value of indetermination.

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